Epistemic Situationism

This is the first sustained examination of epistemic situationism. Many philosophers explain knowledge in terms of epistemic virtues and vices. But psychological research suggests that environmental variables have greater explanatory power than character traits. The problem is addressed here from both sceptical and conservative viewpoints.

This volume is the first sustained examination of epistemic situationism: the clash between virtue epistemology and the situationist hypothesis inspired by research in empirical psychology. Situationism began as a challenge to the psychology of character traits, targeting ethical theories that presuppose a trait psychology. Psychological research suggests that (often trivial) environmental variables have greater explanatory power than character traits. Epistemology pursues questions about the nature of knowledge. While there are internal differences within virtue epistemology between responsibilists and reliabilists, they all analyze knowledge in terms of epistemic virtues and vices. However, despite promising normative results, virtue epistemology appears to assume the same character-based psychology as virtue ethics does.

Until recently, virtue epistemology and situationism were separate literatures, but philosophers have begun to examine the apparent incompatibility bet ween situationist psychology and virtue epistemology. Much of the psychological research that raises questions about the empirical adequacy of the moral psychology of virtue ethics also appears to raise doubts about the empirical adequacy of the epistemic psychology assumed by virtue epistemology. Responsibilist virtue epistemology appears particularly vulnerable because epistemic virtues like open mindedness, conscientiousness and intellectual courage are traits of intellectual character, but reliabilist virtue epistemology appeals to the psychology of cognitive skills, abilities, and competences that may be similarly vulnerable. The essays in this volume take up this new problem of epistemic situationism from multiple points of view - some sceptical or revisionary, others conservative.

Inhaltsverzeichnis:

Introduction: Epistemic Situationism
1: Lauren Olin: Is Every Epistemology A Virtue Epistemology?
2: Mark Alfano: Epistemic Situationism: An extended prolepsis
3: Berit Brogaard: 1. Virtue Epistemology in the Zombie Apocalypse: Hungry Judges, Heavy Clipboards and Group Polarization
4: James Montmarquet: Situationism and Responsibilist Virtue Epistemology
5: Ernest Sosa: Virtue Theory Against Situationism
6: Chris Lepock: Intellectual Virtue Now and Again
7: Kurt Sylvan: Responsibilism Out of Character
8: John Turri: Epistemic Situationism and Cognitive Ability
9: J. Adam Carter and Duncan Pritchard: Epistemic Situationism, Epistemic Dependence and the Epistemology of Education
10: Jason Baehr: The Situationist Challenge to Educating For Intellectual Virtues
11: Heidi Grasswick: Feminist Responsibilism, Situationism and the Complexities of the Virtue of Trustworthiness
12: Nicole Smith: Moods and Their Unexpected Virtues